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Abstract
Mobile device users avoiding observational attacks and coping with situational impairments
may employ techniques for eyes-free mobile unlock authentication, where a user enters his/her
passcode without looking at the device. This study supplies an initial description of user accu-
racy in performing this authentication behavior with PIN and pattern passcodes, with varying
lengths and visual characteristics. Additionally, we inquire if tactile-only feedback can provide
assistive spatialization, finding that orientation cues prior to unlocking do not help. Measure-
ments of edit distance and dynamic time warping accuracy were collected, using a within-group,
randomized study of 26 participants. 1,021 passcode entry gestures were collected and classified,
identifying six user strategies for using the pre-entry tactile feedback, and ten codes for types
of events and errors that occurred during entry. We found that users who focused on orienting
themselves to position the first digit of the passcode using the tactile feedback performed better
in the task. These results could be applied to better define eyes-free behavior in further research,
and to design better and more secure methods for eyes-free authentication.
1 Introduction
The threat of observational attacks in shared or public spaces may influence or modify the way
smartphone users interact with their devices. In particular, users may favor unlocking their mobile
devices out-of-view, without looking at the screen to avoid others from surfing the authenticator.
Purposeful user obfuscation (e.g. keeping the screen out of sight from third parties or hidden
cameras by hiding the device in the pocket or bag [1]) for purposes of the initial stages of the
interaction, limits the likelihood of the authentication sequence being viewed. This can put users
at some level of ease, even if the remainder of the interaction is performed in-view of third parties.
Eyes-free authentication behaviors may also be performed when the situation, context or en-
vironment demands it. For example, in situations where glare may be factor, or the environment
is inappropriate for mobile device usage and discretion is needed (e.g. [17], the interaction may
be performed away from view). While eyes-free interactions for different types of mobile device
have been studied by researchers in the past [5, 6, 10, 11, 16, 20, 24, 21, 26, 31, 39], studies have
∗A version of this paper is to appear in the Journal of Information Security and Applications (JISA)
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yet to examine real world eyes-free authentication behaviors; investigating the performance with
common authentication mechanisms when the phone is out-of-view, and user coping strategies to
enter passcodes in an eyes-free manner.
To address this knowledge gap, we conducted a randomized, multi-factor study with 26 partic-
ipants entering PINs and gesture-based patterns (termed: ”patterns” in this paper). Participants
entered passcodes under both in-view and eyes-free conditions, as well as eyes-free using an addi-
tional training module for spatialization based on tactile feedback.
The tactile channel was chosen to discreetly offer cues directly to the user’s hand, without
drawing attention during interaction, as would likely occur with auditory or visual cues. Existing
assistive aids aid to eyes-free PIN authentication, such as iOS VoiceOver, rely on audio feedback
(audio readout of PIN number buttons when touched, allowing selection). However, audio cues
impose usability and security penalties in shared and public spaces.
Biometric authentication such as fingerprint identification can greatly expedite this task for
many users. However, fingerprint identification remains only a secondary means of authentication,
which is generally tied to a PIN or patterns for screen unlocking. Essentially, even biometric
authentication users must necessarily enter conventional passcodes on a semi-regular basis, and
eyes-free conditions may apply in some instances.
In light of this, tactile-only feedback was designed for this study as a research device for under-
standing authentication performance with strictly eyes-free interaction. Its functionality, and our
evaluation of its performance, is not intended to propose a workable real-world tool in the present
form. Instead, we tried to capture how users develop techniques that use additional spatial cues
to locate key screen features. This spatialization might then assist the accuracy and precision of
eyes-free authentication gestures, especially for situations where the user may feel at risk of being
a victim of an observer attack or be at risk of a situational impairment.
Given these assumptions, we have undertaken these research questions:
• RQ1: How well are users able to perform eyes-free authentication (without tactile feedback)
with common methods, such as PIN and pattern entry, and how is this affected by the length
and visual features of passcodes?
• RQ2: Will the relationship between spatial cues to screen layout features (e.g. position of
buttons), presented by tactile interaction, enhance the user’s performance when authenticat-
ing eyes-free?
• RQ3: When tactile feedback is presented, what approaches will users develop for using it?
With these considerations, during the experiment we collected complete movement traces,
recording all participants’ touch-based gestures during each authentication attempt, totaling 1021
eyes-free traces. To extend the work described in [36], we aimed to understand the input techniques
and strategies the participants developed when completing the tasks. To do this, we classified all
the traces, and developed a set of verified and grounded labels to describe the actions of the par-
ticipants.
We further evaluated participants’ performance in the eyes-free setting in two dimensions, accu-
racy and precision. For accuracy, we considered the edit-distance (or Levenshtein distance) between
the input passcode and the true passcode. The edit-distance considers the number of additions or
removals to transform one string sequence into another. For precision, we developed a geomet-
ric distance measure between in-view and eyes-free traces using Dynamic Time Warping (DTW),
computing the average distance between temporally-associated points in the trace.
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Based on this analysis, we found that participants using patterns were more accurate and precise
in eyes-free settings, as compared to PINs. Additional tactile training was found to not improve
the accuracy or precision of the participants’ entries. We discuss users’ observations regarding
this distinction between task performances. When applying the classification results, we found
that specific techniques in both training stages impacted performance. In particular, traces where
participants used the additional tactile training aid to understand specifically the location of the
starting digit of their passcode showed the most significant increase in performance, for both PINs
and patterns. In addition to identifying techniques that improved performance, we also developed
a set of classifications for eyes-free entry and training.
The results firstly contribute to an initial baseline of performance results and classifications of
types for eyes-free interaction behaviors, events, and error types. We also show that the describe
strategies for locating the starting location of authentication gestures (i.e. the screen position of
the button for a passcode’s first digit) that correspond with a number of significant effects on
user performance. These results will help further research on eyes-free interaction make accurate
comparisons and descriptions regarding this condition. Additionally, these insights will help iterate
the design of targeted training aids for users, such as blind mobile technology users who rely on
secure ubiquitous computing for privacy-sensitive tasks in shared spaces, who need to authenticate
frequently in eyes-free settings (i.e. when at perceived risk of an observer attack described in
[1]). Informing users of effective techniques will enable users to enter unlock authentication more
confidently, securely, and accurately, away from adversarial observation.
While the tactile aid adopted for this study produced a mostly negative result from accuracy
and edit distance measures, we assert several important contributions from this investigation:
1. A novel characterization of HCI and security performance conditions for eyes-free authenti-
cation tasks.
2. A systematic inquiry of accuracy, precision, and timing effects of input in eyes-free settings.
3. Establishing the unequivocal performance gap between eyes-free PIN and pattern entry (al-
though unsurprising, this is the first time this has been shown empirically).
4. The extension of existing classification methodology for coding eyes-free unlock entry methods
and events, similar to error codes established in von Zezschwitz et al. [35].
5. Identifying significant relationships between classification codes and authentication conditions
(e.g. a decrease in Start-Hunt behavior for pattern passcodes (χ2 = 8.17, p < 0.005)).
6. Identifying passcodes features for which accuracy and/or precision significantly deviated from
average (e.g. self-crossing pattern 743521).
We feel the relationship between the initial training methods that users develop using the tactile
aid, such as those that help locate the starting point of the authentication gesture, are particularly
illustrative. Strategies, such as the Start-Hunt trial code and Return to Start training code, offer
an insight into the ways that users cope with the challenges of entering gestures under eyes-free
conditions. By being able to better understand user strategies taken, along with events and error
types made, this work could lead to the improved support of targeted training aids for users who
interact with mobile authentication solutions under eyes-free conditions.
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2 Related Work
2.1 Eyes-Free Interaction Techniques
As mobile technologies reduce in size and provide increasing amounts of PC-like functionality, these
technologies become an attractive option for performing tasks while on-the-go. As information
is predominantly presented via the graphical user interface, the user is heavily reliant on visual
feedback to perform mobile tasks.
However, there are scenarios when difficulties are faced viewing the interface. One of the
predominant issues relates to worries about third parties viewing content, and using this information
without permission. Examples described by Yi et al. [38] include (1) environmental factors (e.g.
excessive brightness impacting the user’s ability to perceive screen content, and in scenarios where
switching visual attention between the device and the physical environment poses safety concerns),
(2) social factors (e.g. instances where it may be socially-inappropriate to view the screen, or multi-
task in front of others), (3) constraints imposed by the mobile devices themselves (e.g. difficulties
seeing content due to the crowded nature of content on mobile GUIs), and (4) personal factors (e.g.
no perceived benefit to using vision to performing the task).
Additionally, if the user feels under threat of observer attacks, the screen may be hidden from
view, either shielded by the hand [23], or placed within a garment or accessory [1]. The user
can then attempt to use a combination of a mental image of the interface and muscle memory to
attempt to interact with the device.
One of the fundamental motivations for eyes-free interaction is that as it leaves visual attention
unoccupied, users are free to perform additional tasks [30]. However, performing mobile tasks
when visual and other forms of feedback are not available, can lead to errors during the input
process, and contribute to levels of frustration among users. To better support users, a range of
techniques have been developed involving gestural input (e.g. [5, 10, 11, 16, 26, 33, 39]), or voice
input (e.g. [6, 24]), along with accessible forms of output to provide feedback to the user (e.g.
audio [10, 11, 21, 33, 39], and/or tactile output [20, 33] either to the user’s hand via the mobile
device or via a separate wearable. Similar technologies have also been designed to support users
for whom the visual channel is restricted or blocked (i.e., individuals who are blind and visually-
impaired [7, 18, 19, 22, 27], with the aim of substituting or complementing visual feedback with
other forms of accessible information). However, any solutions developed would ideally need to
work in conjunction with existing assistive technologies (e.g., screen readers).
2.2 Augmenting Interfaces to Support Eyes-Free Interactions
To help users orient position and better understand the layout of content on a mobile interface
during eyes-free interactions, non-visual cues have been added to the interface. The PocketMenu
solution [31] for pocket-based mobile device interactions, presents tactile information to convey
the position and state of buttons, arrayed along the left edge of the mobile phone touchscreen, to
exploit the natural tactile localization that the outer bezel of the phone affords. Findings from the
researchers’ study showed that PocketMenu outperformed auditory output (VoiceOver) in terms of
completion time, selection errors, and subjective usability, making it ideal for interactions where
the user is on-the-go [31]. McGookin et al. [28] used tactile overlays to support interaction with a
visual touchscreen. Recommendations proposed to support eyes-free interactions include presenting
a discernible button for orientation (i.e. home button), through the use of a tactile aid such as
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an adhesive bump-on, and providing feedback for all interactions. However, care should be taken
with the latter, to ensure that the user is not overloaded with feedback. Oakley and Park [30] note
the trade-off which designers should be aware of - between the amount of information contained
within user interface feedback, the speed with which this can be achieved and the amount of effort
and attention required to interpret it. This is thought to be especially important in the eyes-free
domain. Existing research has not directly addressed tactile feedback using built-in actuators for
eyes-free authentication, that would orient users to any passcode starting position.
2.3 Device and interaction modification for authentication
Although not designed specifically to improve accessibility of entry under eyes-free conditions,
researchers have adopted a series of methods to reduce the likelihood of adversarial observations.
Examples include the Back of Device scheme, proposed by De Luca et al. [14], who used a simulated
double-sided touchscreen to allow users to grip the device in two hands, and conceal a secondary
authentication action. This was found to be more resistant to simulated observation attacks than
other common login methods. In terms of presenting information through alternative senses, the
tactile channel has been a popular method of communicating information relating to the authen-
tication discreetly to the user. Examples include the Haptic Wheel [8], where the user positions
their hand around a rotary dial. After each input, the system randomizes the vibration it emits to
protect the user from observer attack, and the VibraPass system [15], where the system presents
tactile cues to the user’s hands to indicate when to enter false PIN numbers to randomize each
entry. While this modification added little time to a typical interaction (averaging 1.68 additional
seconds), randomized PINs were intercepted by the simulated shoulder surfers 32.5% of the time
(versus 100% for non-VibraPass patterns). Other tactile solutions include H4Plock, proposed by
Ali et al. [2], where the user is required to enter a sequence of up to four pre-selected on-screen
gestures while responding to tactile prompts signaling whether stimuli from a primary or secondary
passcode should be entered. The solution proved to be secure against 76.5% of participants, who
carried out attacks immediately after watching a set of videos. Participants were able to express
strong levels of confidence in using the system.
Limited work has been conducted exploring existing common mobile authentication mechanisms
and their use when the user needs to purposely obfuscate the screen to perform tasks in an eyes-free
manner. In this paper, we describe a study investigating PIN and graphical pattern entry using
tactile feedback, when the device is out of view, with the aim to unlocking entry. While auditory
feedback appears to be an appealing solution to this scenario, it may be impractical. Providing
an auditory representation of screen content may be insecure or an unacceptable distraction. Fur-
thermore, auditory cues from a mobile device may be masked by ambient noise, which may pose
challenges when attempting to authenticate entry. Tactile feedback may offer a solution to directing
users to make accurate entry gestures (e.g. finding the start position of their passcode). A tactile
aid to support orientation has also been evaluated, as part of this research. To better understand
user behaviors, we aim to focus on input techniques, and methods of classifying these.
3 Study Design and Procedure
We designed a within-subjects, multi-factor study where participants were asked to enter authen-
tication sequences under four primary conditions. To address RQ1, out-of-view performance was
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Figure 1: Study procedure: Participants are informed of the make-up of the experiment, and basic
demographic and usage data is collected in step (1). In step (2), participants are trained on the
application interface for data collection for both PINs and patterns, and spend time interacting
with the training aid (the first prompt/orient phase). Without the training aid, participants in
trial A and B proceed directly to the next phase. After completing the training stage, step (3) the
trials begin alternating between the conditions as presented in Table 1.
measured and compared to that of in-view. RQ2 is addressed by the inclusion of with- and without-
tactile feedback conditions. The conditions are described in more detail below:
• in-view w/o training aid: participants performed the tasks completely in-view where they
could view the device and the entry thereon, without a training aid.
• in-view w/ training aid: participants performed the tasks completely in-view with a tactile/vibration-
based training aid.
• eyes-free w/o training aid: participants performed the tasks out-of-view (eyes-free) without
a training aid.
• eyes-free w/ training aid: participants performed the task with a tactile/vibration-based
training aid.
Within each condition, the participants were assigned a sequence of 10 PINs or patterns to
enter, of which 5 were length 4 PINs/patterns and 5 were length 6 PINs/patterns. We summarize
these conditions and the set of authentication passcodes in Table 1 and Table 2, respectively.
Passcodes were sourced from real world data to establish validity, and selected individually to
include important visual characteristics for analysis, for example left vs. right side shift, and self
crossing patterns. For all experiments, we used a Nexus 5x, which has a common 5.79” x 2.86”
form factor, 5.2” display, 1080x1920 resolution. The steps of the study are illustrated in Figure 1.
The procedure and study design are similar to that presented in related work [32, 34].
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Eyes-Free In-View
A) w/o tactile aid B) w/o tactile aid
A1) 4-digit PIN A3) 4-len Pattern B1) 4-digit PIN B3) 4-len Pattern
A2) 6-digit PIN A4) 6-len Pattern B2) 6-digit PIN B4) 6-len Pattern
C) w/ tactile aid D) w/ tactile aid
C1) 4-digit PIN C3) 4-len Pattern D1) 4-digit PIN D3) 4-len Pattern
C2) 6-digit PIN C4) 6-len Pattern D2) 6-digit PIN D4) 6-len Pattern
Table 1: Conditions for study
3.1 Study Procedure
As presented in Figure 1, the study consists of three steps: (1) introduction/pre-study, (2) training
stage, and (3) experimental trials. In total, the procedure took about 40 minutes per participant,
as training time was allocated to familiarize participants with relevant authentication issues, the
two training aids, and the methods of the study. This was undertaken to prepare participants at
least up to a low level of performance that could simulate everyday usage. To begin, in step (1),
participants provided informed consent of participation (as required by the IRB), and were asked a
series of pre-survey questions. This included demographic questions as well as questions regarding
their mobile phone usage and locking habits.
The training phase followed. As we developed a specialized data collection application that
directed and stepped users through the procedure (see Figure 1 for more details), it was necessary to
provide training and familiarization with the interface to allow participants to focus on accuracy and
precision using the tactile feedback rather than any unnecessary memorization tasks. In particular,
we wished for participants to be fully aware of each of the authentication codes (i.e., all the PIN and
pattern examples that they would encounter so they would be familiar with them when entering
them in an eyes-free manner). A visual reference of the passcode to be entered was always available
throughout all conditions, via a laptop showing the passcode. We also wished to train participants
on the tactile aid that some of the trials would employ (condition C and D in Table 1), so that
they could maximize the use of the aid. We also wanted to give participants some simulated
trial runs under eyes-free conditions, where they could subsequently review their performance by
viewing replays of their entries, provided within the data collection application. Once participants
were comfortable with the interface, the procedure, and the tactile feedback aid, the trials for each
condition began. The conditions were randomized using a Latin Square.
3.2 Interface and Tactile Feedback Design
A web-based application was developed using HTML5 to collect data for the study. When opened in
a smartphone’s web browser, the application interfaces closely simulated the layout, font, animation,
luminance, color, and interaction of typical mobile authentication screens. The pattern interface
displayed the standard Android OS 3x3 grid, and the PIN interface displayed the standard 0-9 digit
layout (telephone dial-pad style), including a text display that showed entered digits (which are
obfuscated to an “*” after 1 second), a back/delete button next to the display, and an “OK” button
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to the right of the “0” to submit the PIN. Graphical depictions of the application are presented in
Figure 1 with the study’s procedures.
The data collection application’s interface is designed to assist the study procedure by presenting
the participant with an authentication code and then directing users to place the device in the eyes-
free setting to complete the experiment. Additionally, to support RQ3, the interface implemented
the tactile feedback aid if the condition called for that. The interface application also collected
and stored traces of all touch interactions. A trace consisted of the x- and y-coordinate of a touch
event and the time in which that event occurred. To direct participants in the eyes-free setup, the
interface played audible “beeps” to indicate to the participants transition between the steps of the
experiment.
To facilitate the eyes-free setting, we used a shielding box in which the participant can interact
with and hold the device in a natural posture, but cannot see the device itself (see Figure 2).
Cut-outs in the sides of the shielding box allowed the researchers to observe the interaction, which
the participant is unable to view. We placed no restrictions on how the user chose to interact with
the device, i.e, using one or two hands, as long as they were not able to view the device directly.
The interface also incorporated tactile feedback in the form of vibrations for touches that oc-
curred within a digit/point. This feature was not originally included in our experiment, and was
added after prototyping the procedures based on participant feedback. We believe this is a rea-
sonable choice given that most unlock authentication systems already incorporate this style of
feedback.
In the conditions with the tactile training aid, participants were able to use the aid to ori-
ent with the interface prior to beginning the eyes-free authentication stage. The orientation oc-
curred during continual touching, where a participant can swipe around the screen, receiving tac-
tile/vibrational feedback when swiping over a digit/point. If the digit/point is the first digit/point
in the PIN/pattern, a vibration cue encoded with a faster rhythm was used to differentiate this
point from the others; however, no other passcode specific feedback was provided. Once the partic-
ipant lifts their finger, ending the continuous swiping, the interface “beeps” indicating they should
attempt to enter the authentication. Trace information was collected during tactile training phase
as well in the same format as in the authentication phase.
3.3 Pre- and Post-Survey Procedures
In steps (1) and (3), we asked participants a set of pre- and post-survey questions. Copies of the
questions are presented in the Appendix. The questions included basic demographic information, as
well as inquiries regarding mobile device usage, such as OS, time, and locking behavior. Reported
statistics are available in Table 3.
In the pre-survey portion, participants were also asked a series of questions about how they chose
passcodes, their concern for phone security, experiences with device theft or unauthorized access,
and how those factors might have affected their behavior. Two questions were Likert responses, on
a scale from 1-5:
• How concerned are you with keeping your phone secure (1, not at all concerned, to 5, highly
concerned)?
• How concerned are you typically, in public spaces, with the threat of someone watching you
authenticate and collecting your passcodes (1, not at all concerned, to 5, highly concerned).
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PINs Patterns
4-length
1328 0145
1955 1346
5962 3157
6702 4572
7272 6745
6-length
153525 014763
159428 136785
366792 642580
441791 743521
458090 841257
Table 2: PINs and patterns used in experiments, and refer-
ence for labeling pattern contact points. See the Appendix and
https://www.dropbox.com/s/m1ujrtt32a7blg2/suplm.zip?dl=0Supplementary Materials
for graphical depictions of the authentication
.
Responses to these questions did not significantly correlate with performance on the task, but
did provide some information on the participants usage and locking behavior and mindset that is
relevant to the task. The responses are also presented in Table 3.
Following the tasks, during the post-survey, we asked questions regarding the ease or difficulty
of the task itself, with or without the tactile feedback aid. These results are presented in the results
section of the paper.
3.4 Passcode Selection
To select the passcodes, both PINs and patterns, we sought to use a representative sample from real
world data for validity, that also had good spatial features in terms of the regions of the screen that
must be touched. As such, we used the set of PINs and patterns published in related work [4, 13].
The set of passcodes are presented in Table 2 and visuals are provided in the Appendix and the
https://www.dropbox.com/s/m1ujrtt32a7blg2/suplm.zip?dl=0Supplementary Materials 1.
Following [4], the PINs from the study were culled from publicly leaked password sets, using
sequences of 4 or 6 digits. This is an acceptable practice in simulating PINs from related work [9], as
good realistic data is not available for purposes of research. Patterns from [4] were selected from [3]
using spatial criteria, where the authors ensured good spatial criteria: up, down, left, right, and
neutral shifts.
3.5 Participants and Recruitment
Participants were recruited via a university mailing list, alongside the use of the snowball sampling
technique. The latter was used with the aim of recruiting a wider, more representative group of
mobile device users. There were 26 individuals recruited, comprising of 12 male and 14 female
younger adults. Participants were fully sighted mobile users, evenly divided between using iOS and
Android. For their current unlock conditions, many used their fingerprint in addition to another
1Supplementary materials - https://www.dropbox.com/s/m1ujrtt32a7blg2/suplm.zip?dl=0
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Figure 2: Participant holding the LG Nexus 5x test phone inside the eyes-free observation box.
lock mechanism, such as a PIN or pattern. Only 2 participants had no lock authentication on their
smartphone. Details are provided in Table 3.
3.6 Realism and Limitations
As the study was performed under controlled in-person conditions, the set-up introduced some
constraints which reduced the level of realism. Examples include the slightly extended posture of
the user’s arm, holding and pointing with the mobile device when interacting within the shielding
box. Further work will examine more natural methods of interacting with the device under more
realistic constraints (e.g. the impact of the user entering passcodes while the device is located in
his/her pocket or bag).
In order to provide a baseline control, participants were asked to perform in-view PIN and pat-
tern conditions, with/without the presence of a tactile aid. Due to the randomization of conditions,
half of the group of participants performed this condition after the eyes-free condition. This was
conducted to minimize the likelihood of an order effect. It was acknowledged that this may have led
to a slight performance disadvantage for users performing eyes-free first, as the in-view conditions
may be considered equivalent to a small amount of extra training.
In terms of limitations, passcodes were presented in the same order to all participants under each
condition. Although passcodes did not necessarily increase in complexity during each condition, it
is acknowledged that this may have contributed to an effect.
While the number of participants recruited for our study either exceeded or remained in line
with those selected for other studies relating to eyes-free interaction (e.g. [31, 28]), the sample
selected for the study described in this paper, can be considered small in size (n=26), and limited
in range of demographic features. While significance was found within our results, challenges can
be faced when samples are very small, which can impact the power of the study and increase the
margin of error. Similarly, the representativeness of findings may be impacted if the samples are
too limited in terms of age. The sample in our study reflected the university environment (i.e.
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Male Female Total
total 12 14 26
a
g
e 18-24 7 7 14
24-34 5 7 12
O
S Android 8 5 13
iOs 4 9 13
U
n
lo
ck
C
h
o
ic
e
Fingerprint 5 10 15
PIN-6 2 7 9
PIN-4 5 4 9
Pattern 4 2 9
No-Lock 1 1 2
L
ev
el
o
f
C
o
n
fi
d
en
ce
(1
-5
L
ik
er
t) Phone Security 3.75 3.79 3.77
(STD: 1.42) (STD: 0.7) (STD: 1.07)
Shoulder Surfing 3.08 3.79 3.46
(STD: 1.24) (STD: 0.97) (STD: 1.140
Table 3: Demographics of participants
younger adults). It is also acknowledged that participants who were primarily iOS users may have
been at a slight disadvantage in levels of experience interacting with stroke-based patterns, as these
types of mechanism are found on devices running the Android OS. However, training was provided
to familiarize users with the process, which helped to offset any potential disparity. Finally,as
participants came from a university, issues of bias may have also been introduced from the working
environment. While it is not uncommon in authentication studies to recruit participants comprising
mainly of students, future studies would aim to widen the pool, with the aim of recruiting a more
diverse sample, who are more representative of the array of individuals who use mobile devices
(e.g., participants with varying levels of concern about security).
4 Results
In this section, we present the results of both the performance of the participants, as well as the
classification of the traces and training techniques. We begin with a description of the metrics
applied, followed by the performance results, and finish with the classification results.
4.1 Performance Metrics
Accuracy. A crucial and informative metric to determine effectiveness is simply how accurately
participants performed the tasks in eyes-free settings. Of course, authentication is a binary response:
either participants entered the passcodes correctly or not. As we are also interested in granularity
of performance, we also considered the edit distance, normalized to the distance of each passcode.
More precisely, we considered accuracy as a fraction calculated for a passcode p and entered code
p′
acc =
len(p)− d(p, p′)
len(p)
where len(p) is the length of the passcode and d(p, p′) is the edit distance between the entered and
expected passcode. The edit distance (or Levenshtein distance) computes the number of additions,
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(a) (b)
Figure 3: Example of using DTW to do point reduction: In (a) The blue trace is eyes-free and the
red trace is in-view, and the green lines show the points in the blue trace time sequence matched
to points in the red trace; and in (b), associated points in the blue trace are merged via Euclidean
average to form a set of singly matched points to the red trace. The precision metric is then the
average Euclidean distance between the matched point of the blue trace with the red one.
subtractions, or replacements needed to transform one sequence into another. For example, if the
task requires entering the passcode 123456, and the participant entered 12356 (or any passcode off
by one in some dimension), then the accuracy would be (6− 1)/6 or 0.83 as the edit distance is 1.
This is a generous accuracy measure in the sense that the edit distance is a greedy algorithm and
tries to aggressively match strings. However, given the nature of the task, eyes-free entry, we feel
that this provides a better reflection on participant effort and performance than a binary yes/no.
Precision. As a second measure of performance, we wish to compare the traces of the eyes-free entry
to that of the in-view entry. Recall that interface application collects detailed trace information for
each touch event in the form of d = (x, y, t) where x is a width coordinate, y is a height coordinate,
and t is a time indication from the start of the interaction. The goal is to develop a method that
allows two sequences, which may be time dilated with different number of points, to be compared
in the 2-D space.
The solution to this was the use of Dynamic Time Warping (DTW), which has been used
extensively in the space of free-form gesture authentication [37, 25, 12, 14]. DTW takes two time
series sequences and aligns one to the other to best match the time dilation present. For example,
in Figure 3(a), the blue trace is the eyes-free trace and the red trace is the in-view trace. Notice
that the blue trace (eyes-free) is longer in time (will have more points in the trace) and also have
more loops due to mistakes during entry. Comparing these two traces directly, such as point by
point, would indicate that the participant performed the authentication task quite poorly, but in
fact, here, this is an 100% accurate entry of pattern 136785.
With DTW, we can better show the precision of the user. First, DTW will associate points in
one time series with the other based on a distance measure, which is Euclidean in this case. In
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Tactile Aid Pattern PIN t-test
acc.
w/o (µ = 0.80, σ = 0.28, n = 250) (µ = 0.72, σ = 0.30, n = 260) t = 3.08,p < 0.05∗
w/ (µ = 0.83, σ = 0.27, n = 253) (µ = 0.71, σ = 0.30, n = 258) t = 4.78,p < 0.001 ∗ ∗
t-test t = 1.17,p = 0.243 t = −0.49,p = 0.628
prec.
w/o (µ = 80.93, σ = 60.40, n = 250) (µ = 145.18, σ = 90.29, n = 260) t = −9.41,p < 0.001 ∗ ∗
w/ (µ = 83.21, σ = 69.74, n = 253) (µ = 154.49, σ = 94.11, n = 258) t = −9.71,p < 0.001 ∗ ∗
t-test t = 0.39,p = 0.695 t = 1.15,p = 0.251
start
w/o (µ = 80.51, σ = 67.62, n = 250) (µ = 96.56, σ = 109.79, n = 260) t = −1.98,p < 0.05∗
w/ (µ = 68.35, σ = 61.96, n = 253) (µ = 91.77, σ = 86.46, n = 258) t = −3.51,p < 0.001 ∗ ∗
t-test t = −2.10,p < 0.05∗ t = −0.55,p = 0.582
time (ms)
w/o (µ = 7134.86, σ = 6672.95, n = 250) (µ = 8597.35, σ = 6314.62, n = 260) t = −2.54,p < 0.05∗
w/ (µ = 7500.12, σ = 5359.63, n = 253) (µ = 10227.07, σ = 8236.91, n = 258) t = −4.43,p < 0.001 ∗ ∗
t-test t = 0.68,p = 0.499 t = 2.53,p < 0.05∗
Table 4: Performance results: acc. is the accuracy using the edit-distance measure, prec. is the precisions using the DTW method,
start is the Euclidian distance of the start point, and time refers to the number of milliseconds. As the data followed a normal
distribution, we used a two-tailed t-test. Horizontally, the t-test compared Pattern vs. PIN results, and vertically, the t-test
compared w/ and w/o the tactile aid. Effect size of α = 0.05 was considered significant. Only traces that were complete and
collected without errors were considered.
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Pattern Metric w/o Tactile Aid w/ Tactile Aid t-test
0145
acc (µ = 0.81, σ = 0.27, n = 25) (µ = 0.86, σ = 0.27, n = 25) t = −0.66, p = 0.510
prec (µ = 82.66, σ = 50.16, n = 25) (µ = 71.77, σ = 62.11, n = 25) t = 0.68, p = 0.499
1346
acc (µ = 0.88, σ = 0.19, n = 25) (µ = 0.87, σ = 0.22, n = 26) t = 0.25, p = 0.801
prec (µ = 57.19, σ = 28.84, n = 25) (µ = 72.96, σ = 37.22, n = 26) t = −1.69, p = 0.098
3157
acc (µ = 0.78, σ = 0.31, n = 25) (µ = 0.75, σ = 0.28, n = 26) t = 0.36, p = 0.717
prec (µ = 89.60, σ = 77.38, n = 25) (µ = 87.02, σ = 45.19, n = 26) t = 0.15, p = 0.885
4572
acc (µ = 0.92, σ = 0.14, n = 25) (µ = 0.80, σ = 0.29, n = 25) t = 1.86, p = 0.068
prec (µ = 67.62, σ = 31.71, n = 25) (µ = 130.00, σ = 125.20, n = 25) t = −2.41, p = 0.020*
6745
acc (µ = 0.68, σ = 0.38, n = 25) (µ = 0.74, σ = 0.42, n = 25) t = −0.53, p = 0.595
prec (µ = 111.61, σ = 96.17, n = 25) (µ = 90.51, σ = 80.56, n = 25) t = 0.84, p = 0.405
014763
acc (µ = 0.81, σ = 0.26, n = 25) (µ = 0.87, σ = 0.24, n = 26) t = −0.74, p = 0.461
prec (µ = 82.28, σ = 68.34, n = 25) (µ = 73.37, σ = 66.77, n = 26) t = 0.47, p = 0.640
136785
acc (µ = 0.80, σ = 0.23, n = 25) (µ = 0.86, σ = 0.22, n = 25) t = −0.93, p = 0.356
prec (µ = 70.12, σ = 37.28, n = 25) (µ = 80.78, σ = 53.51, n = 25) t = −0.82, p = 0.418
642580
acc (µ = 0.78, σ = 0.25, n = 25) (µ = 0.79, σ = 0.23, n = 25) t = −0.20, p = 0.844
prec (µ = 78.69, σ = 40.08, n = 25) (µ = 109.83, σ = 76.32, n = 25) t = −1.81, p = 0.077
743521
acc (µ = 0.77, σ = 0.27, n = 25) (µ = 0.92, σ = 0.17, n = 26) t = −2.34, p = 0.024*
prec (µ = 89.66, σ = 69.72, n = 25) (µ = 54.70, σ = 26.51, n = 26) t = 2.38, p = 0.021*
841257
acc (µ = 0.80, σ = 0.31, n = 25) (µ = 0.86, σ = 0.22, n = 24) t = −0.79, p = 0.434
prec (µ = 79.91, σ = 49.08, n = 25) (µ = 62.14, σ = 32.16, n = 24) t = 1.49, p = 0.142
Table 5: Performance Metrics per-Pattern: Comparisons were made with-out (w/o) and with (w/) the tactile aid, and a t-test is
used as the data is normal. Note that not all participants provided valid traces, and invalid traces were excluded.
14
PIN Metric w/o Tactile Aid w/ Tactile Aid t-test
1328
acc (µ = 0.73, σ = 0.32, n = 26) (µ = 0.69, σ = 0.33, n = 26) t = 0.43, p = 0.672
prec (µ = 110.42, σ = 54.18, n = 26) (µ = 108.75, σ = 41.15, n = 26) t = 0.12, p = 0.901
1935
acc (µ = 0.73, σ = 0.36, n = 26) (µ = 0.62, σ = 0.36, n = 26) t = 1.06, p = 0.296
prec (µ = 149.54, σ = 125.19, n = 26) (µ = 169.98, σ = 104.29, n = 26) t = −0.64, p = 0.525
5962
acc (µ = 0.82, σ = 0.20, n = 26) (µ = 0.72, σ = 0.40, n = 26) t = 1.09, p = 0.280
prec (µ = 136.19, σ = 81.36, n = 26) (µ = 166.62, σ = 119.08, n = 26) t = −1.08, p = 0.287
6702
acc (µ = 0.65, σ = 0.29, n = 26) (µ = 0.63, σ = 0.28, n = 26) t = 0.24, p = 0.810
prec (µ = 176.51, σ = 98.64, n = 26) (µ = 172.79, σ = 97.10, n = 26) t = 0.14, p = 0.891
7272
acc (µ = 0.81, σ = 0.31, n = 26) (µ = 0.67, σ = 0.31, n = 26) t = 1.56, p = 0.124
prec (µ = 174.64, σ = 112.77, n = 26) (µ = 176.16, σ = 100.48, n = 26) t = −0.05, p = 0.959
153525
acc (µ = 0.78, σ = 0.28, n = 26) (µ = 0.82, σ = 0.21, n = 26) t = −0.66, p = 0.515
prec (µ = 115.73, σ = 62.08, n = 26) (µ = 136.91, σ = 78.55, n = 26) t = −1.08, p = 0.286
159428
acc (µ = 0.69, σ = 0.26, n = 26) (µ = 0.72, σ = 0.25, n = 26) t = −0.45, p = 0.654
prec (µ = 125.48, σ = 53.41, n = 26) (µ = 144.00, σ = 92.45, n = 26) t = −0.88, p = 0.380
366792
acc (µ = 0.66, σ = 0.32, n = 26) (µ = 0.71, σ = 0.24, n = 26) t = −0.65, p = 0.517
prec (µ = 178.64, σ = 99.21, n = 26) (µ = 196.46, σ = 107.88, n = 26) t = −0.62, p = 0.538
441791
acc (µ = 0.72, σ = 0.27, n = 26) (µ = 0.81, σ = 0.17, n = 24) t = −1.46, p = 0.151
prec (µ = 173.36, σ = 84.65, n = 26) (µ = 163.50, σ = 73.30, n = 24) t = 0.44, p = 0.663
458090
acc (µ = 0.65, σ = 0.32, n = 26) (µ = 0.71, σ = 0.28, n = 26) t = −0.62, p = 0.540
prec (µ = 111.25, σ = 51.50, n = 26) (µ = 110.44, σ = 53.00, n = 26) t = 0.06, p = 0.956
Table 6: Performance Metrics per-PIN: Comparisons were made with-out (w/o) and with (w/) the tactile aid, and a t-test is used
as the data is normal. Note that not all participants provided valid traces, and invalid traces were excluded.
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Figure 3(a), this matching is represented by the green lines. Based on the matching, point reduction
is performed by averaging the points in the blue trace that match a single point in the red trace,
giving us Figure 3(b). The last step in the metric is to take the average distance between two
matched points, again using Euclidian, which represents the precision of the trace in the eyes-free
setting to the in-view one.
We treated PIN traces as a series of distinct touch event traces since each touch could really be
a drag/swipe and consist of multiple points in the trace. To apply the DTW distance metric for
precision, we merged the touch event traces into a single trace, via concatenation, and then applied
the same routine as described previously. This resulted in extra connections when the participant
transitioned between touch events, but this information is useful when considering the precision as
the direction and regularity of those transitions are measurable and meaningful. We excluded the
last touch event from the analysis, pressing “OK” as this was not always successful in the eyes-free
conditions, and the researcher monitoring the experiment would need to assist in this process.
4.2 Performance Results
The primary performance results are presented in Table 4 with per passcode breakdowns in Table 5
and Table 6. We applied the two metrics (accuracy and precision) described previously to conditions
that considered the use or non-use of the tactile aid with the two unlock authentications, PINs and
patterns. Additionally, we considered two further measurements, the precision of just the start
point, calculated as the Euclidean distance between the first touch event in the in-view to the
eyes-free setting, and the time (in milliseconds) of entering the authentication in the eyes-free
setting.
As observed in Table 4, the impact of the tactile aid is rather limited. There were small effects
for patterns, as compared to no effect in PINs, and the effect was most notable when it comes to
the start point in the pattern. Using the aid showed a significant improvement in starting accuracy
as compared to not using the tactile aid. This is reasonable given that the tactile aid performed
different vibration feedback for the first point/digit in the passcode. As the t-test performed is
two-tailed, one can consider the significance for the accuracy measure is somewhat intriguing,
p = 0.243/2 = 0.1215. While this effect is not-significant as a one-tailed result, it is encouraging
for tactile aids in the eyes-free setting, perhaps a better design based on feedback from this study,
could improve the accuracy of entry.
The performance of the tactile aid for PINs can only be explained as detrimental. The eyes-free
task for PINs is already significantly harder, in all conditions, but the addition of the aid showed
worse performance for precision with no effect on accuracy (maybe even hurting accuracy). The
time increase of using the aid is also striking and much larger than the time increase for patterns.
We can speculate as to the reason for this disparity from participants’ post hoc responses regarding
eyes-free PIN entry. It may be that the task is already challenging enough (concentrating on a
series of discrete gestures hitting PIN digits) that the cognitive burden of integrating the aid’s
tactile feedback only decreased the participants’ abilities. This is an area of future investigation,
suggesting that different kinds of tactile aids may be needed for different authentication systems in
the eyes-free setting.
When observing performance impacts of the tactile aid on a per-passcode basis, see Tables 5
and 6, there is no noticeable effect for either accuracy or precision. In only one case, for pattern
743521, was there a significant difference gained from using the tactile aid for both accuracy and pre-
cision. This pattern required doubling-back, (see the https://www.dropbox.com/s/m1ujrtt32a7blg2/suplm.zip?dl=0Supplemental
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Random Touch Partial Explore Wide Explore Start Point Only Return to Start Traced Path
Figure 4: Samples of Training Classification: see Table 8 for description of each classification type
Missed OK (PIN) Used Delete (PIN) Transposed Gave Up Hesitant
End-Hunt Middle-Hunt Start-Hunt Swift Went-Well
Figure 5: Samples of Entry Classification: see Table 8 for description of each classification type
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Classification Name Description PIN Pattern
Random Touch Short gesture away from path 4 (1.61%) 0 (0.00%)
Partial Explore Touched part of space or path 100 (40.32%) 57 (22.98%)
Start Point Only Only traced the area around the first digit 59 (23.79%) 47 (18.95%)
Return to Start Returns to starting point at end of gesture 37 (14.92%) 37 (14.92%)
Wide Explore Touched most of the space 32 (12.90%) 23 (9.27%)
Traced Path Traced the path of the entire passcode 54 (21.77%) 119 (47.98%)
Table 7: Descriptions of the Training Classifications and Frequencies: Frequencies are calculated
based on the total number of traces that received the label. Note that the trace can receive multiple
labels, for example, it is possible to trace the path and return to the start. There was a total of
496 training traces considered, 248 pattern traces and 248 PIN traces.
Material for a graphical depiction) and the tactile aid may have provided some reference points for
that process which improved performance. However, there were some negative results associated
with using the tactile aid. For pattern 4572, there was an effect observed for precision, as the tactile
aid increased the precision score, which degrades the precision of the pattern (smaller distances are
better). This may have been the case that due to the compactness of this pattern, the tactile aid
encouraged participants to take more elaborate/longer paths than they would have normally. In
either case, this is further evidence that introducing aids for the eyes-free setting needs further
investigation.
4.3 Classification Metrics
As a further metric for understanding the techniques that participants applied to eyes-free au-
thentication, we developed a set of classification labels over both the authentication task and the
tactile training. These labels describe observed types of errors (e.g. Transposed or Missed OK) or
actions (e.g. Went Well or Start Hunt) made during passcode entry by participants, or apparent
strategies used to spatialize using the tactile aid (e.g. Wide Explorer or Start Point Only). For
consistency in label development, we adopted a similar approach to that of Micinski et al. [29] and
von Zezschwitz et al [35]. Three researchers independently classified sub-sets, then met periodically
to resolve differences between categorization labels. Although the definitions of some labels were
mutually exclusive (e.g. a gesture could not be both Went Well and also include a Start Middle
or End Hunt event), multiple compatible labels were applied to completely describe each gesture.
Once agreement was reached on labels, one researcher labeled all the data while the other labeled
a 15% random sample. Comparing the ratings labels, there was strong agreement between the two
researchers using Cohen’s kappa (κ = .900, p < 0.0005). Additionally, during this procedure the
researchers marked traces as invalid any observed miss-touches or other errors, which were then
removed from the data sets.
The procedure produced six training labels and ten authentication labels. Visual examples of
these labels are provided in Figures 4 and 5 and descriptions of the labels, with counts, are presented
in Tables 7 and 8. Animated examples of the classifications are provided on the https://unlockclassification.wordpress.comsupplementary
web site2.
2Supplementary web site - https://unlockclassification.wordpress.com
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PIN Pattern
Classification Name Description w/o Tactile Aid w/ Tactile Aid w/o Tactile Aid w/ Tactile Aid
Start-Hunt Missed or hunted for 1st digit/point 61 (12.13%) 49 (9.74%) 66 (13.47%) 37 (7.55%)
End-Hunt Missed or hunted for last digit/point 77 (15.31%) 69 (13.72%) 64 (13.06%) 66 (13.47%)
Middle-Hunt Missed or hunted for midrange digits 104 (20.68%) 116 (23.06%) 95 (19.39%) 103 (21.02%)
Went Well No major errors 111 (22.07%) 94 (18.69%) 105 (21.43%) 117 (23.88%)
Gave Up Just gave up and moved randomly 2 (0.40%) 1 (0.20%) 2 (0.41%) 6 (1.22%)
Transposed Entered right shape in wrong place 11 (2.19%) 3 (0.60%) 12 (2.45%) 3 (0.61%)
Swift Moved swiftly 1 (0.20%) 5 (0.99%) 1 (0.20%) 1 (0.20%)
Hesitant Moved hesitantly 2 (0.40%) 1 (0.20%) 1 (0.20%) 0 (0.00%)
Used Delete (PIN-only) Used Delete button to back up 11 (2.19%) 8 (1.59%) - -
Missed OK (PIN-only) Tried to tap OK but missed ¿2-3 times 43 (8.55%) 43 (8.55%) - -
Table 8: Descriptions of the Entry Classifications: Frequencies are calculated based on the total number of traces that received
that label. Note that the trace can receive multiple labels, for example, it is possible to trace the path and return to the start.
There was a total of 993 entry traces considered, 490 pattern traces and 503 PIN traces.
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4.4 Classification Results
The frequency results for the different classification labels are presented in Tables 7 and 8. The
frequencies are calculated by the total traces in the categories that were labeled as valid. Some traces
were excluded due to either collection errors or misunderstandings on the part of the participant.
For the training classifications (see Table 7), the most common method for entering PINs was
to perform a partial exploration of the interface. This kind of exploration would entail a basic
orientation of the space which would make the participant aware of the digit-buttons. The next
two most common training classifications for PINs are just exploring the start point (Start Point
Only, orienting to where to begin the PIN entry), or tracing out the entire gesture for entering all
of the digits in the PIN (Traced Path).
For patterns, during training, unsurprisingly, the most common technique we observed was
traces that retraced the path of the pattern. This makes sense given the swiping nature of the
pattern. Partial exploration of the grid space and exploring just the start-point only are also quite
common, but only half as common as retracing.
When considering the classifications during entry, the traces are divided into those that use the
tactile aid and which do not. There was no difference statistically in the presence of a label (using
χ2) except for a significant decrease in Start-Hunt for patterns (χ2 = 8.17, p < 0.005). Since the
tactile aid provided distinct feedback when the participant touched the start point, a decrease in
the amount of hunting for the start point is expected. While there was a similar decrease for PIN
entry using the aid, it was not significant (χ2 = 1.31, p = 0.25).
In Table 9, we analyze the impact of training label on performance. For PINs, the accuracy
shows no significant differences across labels. However, we do see a difference for precision. No-
tably, both Start Point Only and Return to Start have much lower distances (higher precision).
Additionally, those that performed a wide exploration had the highest distance (lower precision).
This suggests that training with PINs should encourage a tighter training regime, perhaps confined
to the start digit.
The training classification for patterns had significant differences for both accuracy and preci-
sion. Most notably, the Return to Start label showed much higher accuracy (0.91) and the lowest in
the distance metric (highest precision). We also see strong performance gains for both Start Point
Only and Traced Path. These results suggest that when designing training aids for patterns, just
like PINs, focusing on the start point is important. However, for patterns, encouraging a retrace
of the path of the pattern can also be helpful.
4.5 Discussion from Participants
Quantitative findings suggested that ease of learning and ease of use with the tactile aid were
both harder for PIN compared to patterns (Table 10), In a similar vein, post-hoc discussion with
participants revealed that challenges in the PIN condition were more frequently reported (n=7,
three preferred the PIN aid operation). Several reasons for this were mentioned, most commonly
the difficulty of accurately making long jumps between PIN numbers (e.g. 7 to 3 or 1 to OK, n=6).
Participants also found more closely spaced PIN buttons a challenge (n=3), as well as accurately
hitting the OK button at the end of a PIN sequence (n=3). Several specific passcode features, such
as PIN digits located along the edge opposite a thumb for one-handed users (n=3), and consecutive
numbers (n=1) were also mentioned as challenging factors.
More generally, participants reported the 6-digit PIN and grid conditions as being more difficult
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PIN Pattern
Classification acc. prec acc. prec.
Random Touch (µ = 0.69, σ = 0.32) (µ = 142.75, σ = 140.53) - -
Partial Explore (µ = 0.73, σ = 0.29) (µ = 139.14, σ = 78.03) (µ = 0.78, σ = 0.27) (µ = 84.08, σ = 47.74)
Start Point Only (µ = 0.78, σ = 0.31) (µ = 126.27, σ = 77.20) (µ = 0.88, σ = 0.18) (µ = 75.29, σ = 57.68)
Return to Start (µ = 0.76, σ = 0.24) (µ = 124.19, σ = 59.80) (µ = 0.91, σ = 0.22) (µ = 66.41, σ = 53.93)
Wide Explore (µ = 0.69, σ = 0.31) (µ = 194.93, σ = 114.63) (µ = 0.80, σ = 0.38) (µ = 100.48, σ = 94.65)
Traced Path (µ = 0.67, σ = 0.25) (µ = 169.40, σ = 88.19) (µ = 0.86, σ = 0.26) (µ = 75.51, σ = 57.97)
H = 8.268, p = 0.14 H = 17.74, p < 0.005 ∗ ∗ H = 10.34, p < 0.05∗ H = 11.70, p < 0.05∗
Table 9: Performance Metrics for Training Classifications: Use Kruskal’s H-test to test for significance.
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PIN Pattern
Ease of Learning µ = 2.41, σ = 1.25 µ = 1.89, σ = 0.93
Ease of Use µ = 3.44, σ = 1.01 µ = 2.74, σ = 1.13
Table 10: Likert Responses to Ease of Tactile Aid: Response range from 1-5 (1, very easy, to 5,
very hard).
to perform (n=6), and felt the app itself might be hard to use discreetly in public (n=5). There was
positive feedback on the utility of the distinct start point feature (n=4), which could guide the user
to accurately begin their gesture. Regarding this feature, one participant stated that “it’s all about
the start” in maintaining spatialization throughout authentication gestures. Several participants
also suggested giving the OK and Delete buttons a different vibrotactile coding to enhance the aid.
Two participants related feeling the aid worked best with a two-handed index pointer grip,
but this challenged them because they typically gripped their phones one-handed, with a thumb
pointer. Another participant, also typically a one- handed thumb grip user, noted that PIN jumps
to central digits (e.g. 5 and 8) were much easier than jumps to digits on the outer edges (e.g. 1, 7,
and 9).
5 Conclusion
This study was conducted to examine interaction techniques developed by users when they entered
different types of passcodes on a mobile touchscreen device under eyes-free conditions (e.g., when
worrying about the threat of observer attacks, or when facing situational impairments). We also
inquired if tactile-only spatial feedback would effectively assist users with this type of screen unlock-
ing. We did succeed, firstly, in capturing a picture of eyes-free authentication behaviors for common
passcode entry methods. Looking at accuracy and precision measures, in particular, we can say
regarding RQ1 that eyes-free unlocking overall (without tactile feedback) is understandably very
challenging. PIN authentication is harder to perform with accuracy and precision, likely because
of the numerous jumps the pointing finger must make. Looking at these measures for gestures
that were aided by tactile feedback, as addressed by RQ2, we see a small positive effect on start
point accuracy, for pattern unlocking. Otherwise, the tactile only feedback employed in this study
is not helpful to eyes-free authentication in terms of accuracy, precision, or time taken to unlock.
Movement traces were classified to better understand the strategies undertaken for unlocking and
using tactile feedback, per RQ3. We found that strategies that focused on locating the first digit
of the passcode were helpful. Precision for PIN entry was improved by the Start Point Only and
Return to Start strategies. Similarly, accuracy and precision of pattern entry was helped by use
of the Return to Start strategy. These classifications have been described, and can be used by
other researchers for purposes of analyzing movement traces on mobile touchscreen technologies.
These insights about user strategies, event and error types can also support the design of targeted
authentication training aids for users who may frequently encounter similar eyes-free conditions.
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A Patterns and PINs Visualized
A.1 Patterns
The double circle indicates a start point, single circles is a point included in the pattern. Note that
labeling of patterns begins in the upper left with 0, incrementing across each row, ending in the
lower right with 8. All visuals are also provided in images/patterns sub-directory.
0145 6745 3157 1346 4572
743521 136785 642580 014673 841257
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A.2 PINs
The filled circle • indicates the start point, and unfilled circle ◦ indicates an intermediate point.
Line traces are provided to show expected shape and directionality of a trace, but users do not
drag/maintain contact during entry. Rather, users enter the PIN as normally would be expected
by clicking/pressing the buttons. All visuals are also provided in images/pins sub-directory.
1328 6702 1955 7272 5962
152525 458090 159428 441791 366792
B Pre-Survey Questions
• What is your age (18-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55+, NA)?
• What is your identified gender?
• Do you have any physical conditions that might affect your ability to enter authentication
passcodes on a mobile phone?
• Do you use a smartphone currently? What is its operating system? Why did you select that
phone?
• Do you use an authentication method to lock your phone, and if so which method, and why
(i.e. PIN, grid, TouchID, etc.)?
• Without telling me your current passcode, how do you select the passcodes you use to lock
your phone (i.e. familiar number, or visual pattern)?
• How concerned are you with keeping your phone secure (1, not at all concerned, to 5, highly
concerned)?
• What experiences can you recall involving people either trying to steal or use your phone
without permission?
• What experiences can you recall involving people trying to observe your passcodes without
permission?
27
• How concerned are you, typically, in a public space, with the threat of someone watching you
authenticate and collecting your passcodes (1, not at all concerned, to 5, highly concerned)?
• If you had any of these experiences, how did it affect your behavior?
• Have any other experiences or concerns indirectly affected your authentication behavior (news
articles, stories about friends, etc.)?
• If you do authentication, how do you typically hold your phone for that?
B.1 Post-Survey Questions
• On a scale from 1-5, how difficult was entering passcode this way (1, very easy, to 5, very
hard)? How so?
• On a scale from 1-5, how easy was the grid pattern tactile app to learn (1, very easy, to 5,
very hard)? How so?
• On a scale from 1-5, how easy was the grid pattern tactile app to use (1, very easy, to 5, very
hard)? How so?
• On a scale from 1-5, how easy was the PIN tactile app to learn (1, very easy, to 5, very hard)?
How so?
• On a scale from 1-5, how easy was the PIN tactile app to use (1, very easy, to 5, very hard)?
How so?
• Can you see yourself using the grid pattern tactile aid to help authenticate on your phone in
your actual daily life? Why or why not?
• Can you see yourself using the PIN tactile aid to help authenticate on your phone in your
actual daily life? Why or why not?
• How is this approach similar or different from how you enter passcodes on your phone now?
• Do you think the grid tactile aid would help protect you from someone shoulder surfing you?
Why or why not?
• Do you think the PIN tactile aid would help protect you from someone shoulder surfing you?
Why or why not?
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